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REACHING THE UNREACHED: CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
rapidly increasing availability and installation of mecha-
nised irrigation pumps in rural Bangladesh. Abundant
ground water and surface water facilitate this type of
irrigation in the dry winter season. This irrigation water
has been the leading input for an explosive growth in
paddy production in the last three decennia. Initially
Deep Tube Wells (DTWs) and Low Lift Pumps (LLPs)
were installed. The government provided strong sup-
port, as will be elaborated in paragraph five. But in the
1980s the private market took over: importation was
liberalised and import duties decreased. Especially the
Shallow Tube Wells (STWs) from Japan and, more re-
cently, the smaller and cheaper Chinese STWs have be-
come extremely popular. The number of STWs has incre-
ased to 350,000 in 1992/1993, while the numbers of LLPs
and DTWs are more or less stable at 52,000 and 26,000
respectively (IIMI, 1995). By now technical skills for bo-
ring, maintenance and repair exist in most villages and
the spare parts of especially the Chinese STWs are widely
available. Bamboo pipes and filters, wrapped in old fertili-
zer sacs, reduce investment costs further.
STWs are more popular than DTWs because they are
better adapted to fragmented land tenure and the water
market in Bangladesh. 70 per cent of the landed rural
households cultivate less than 1 ha, and the average
farmer cultivates eight to ten plots in one or more villages
(IIMI, 1995). The nominal water discharge of STWs of 14
- 20 l/s allows to irrigate, say, 6 ha of paddy fields. This
discharge is still more than a farmer needs for his own
plots. The excess water is sold to neighbouring farmers.
This unique combination of technical properties of mod-
ern technology and characteristics of land tenure has
created a farmer-managed water market.
Resource-poor farmers are well integrated in this water
market. Pricing arrangements crystallise more or less per
region. The most current system is payment of crop
shares varying between three sixteenth to one third. This
serves resource-poor farmers. They do not need to invest
during the season and share the risks of crop failure or low
paddy prices with the pump owner. Further, this system
stimulates the pump owner to deliver water properly.
Payment can also be fixed beforehand either in cash or in
kind.Moreover the installation of multiple pumps pre-
vents the monopolisation of equipment by richer land-
lords-cum-waterlords. Tail-enders can shift to alternative
water sellers if water delivery performance is weak. Wa-
ter prices decrease and water delivery performance im-
proves. Under these water market relations more and
REACHING THE PEOPLE whose water needs are still unmet
is primarily a question of strengthening their command
over water technology that leads water in the quantity
and quality needed on the proper moment to the desired
place. This implies their full or partial investments in
appropriate technology fitting their needs and matching
their technical, financial and institutional capacities.
The experiences of female and mixed-sex irrigation groups
in Bangladesh are instructive about the scope for wom-
en’s command over mechanised irrigation pumps and
the benefits they derive from this. These experiences
highlight strengths and weaknesses of markets, govern-
ments and NGOs in reaching resource-poor women (and
men) and clarify the meaning of local gender relations
and women’s organisation. This appears from a study on
women’s participation in 33 female and two mixed-sex
irrigation groups and the impact on women’s status. This
paper will present major findings of this research. The 33
female irrigation groups are supported by Grameen Bank
and four NGOs: Proshika Manobik Unnayan Kendra (or,
in short, Proshika Manobik), Proshika Comilla, Shap-
tagram Nari Swanirvar Parishad (SNSP) and Rangpur
Dinajpur Rural Service (RDRS). The two mixed-sex irri-
gation groups are supported by the Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee (BRAC). Here, an irrigation
group is defined as female if loans are taken in women’s
names, and as mixed-sex if loans are taken in both men’s
and women’s names. Group participation implies manage-
rial contributions (labour, control over the pump, deci-
sion-making), financial contributions (capital and opera-
tional costs) and sharing in the income.
This research project was carried out jointly by the
Department of Irrigation of Wageningen Agricultural
University, The Netherlands, and the Bangladesh Insti-
tute of Development Studies (Koppen and Mahmud,
1996). The project was funded by the Special Programme
Women and Development of the Netherlands Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Field work was done in 1993 and 1994.
Group participation and economic benefits at group level
were studied in all 35 groups. Intra-household contri-
butions and division of benefits and the impact on wom-
en’s economic and non-economic status were studied in
four groups in which women participated actively.
Reaching the resource-poor: markets for
appropriate technology and water
The functioning of NGO-supported irrigation groups
should be understood against the background of the
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more resource-poor farmers and sharecroppers took up
irrigated agriculture. In fact, this wide-spread access to
irrigation water is the very reason why the Green Revolu-
tion in Bangladesh has been especially beneficial to small
farmers (see also Hossain, 1989).
Besides having access to water as clients, more and
more small farmers and sharecroppers also become them-
selves owners of the relatively cheap pumps. The equip-
ment market offers them better access to appropriate
equipment than any of the governmental institutions
have done before. Moreover, new opportunities open up
for the landless: organised in groups they can invest in a
pump and sell the water as entrepreneurs. For an indi-
vidual STWs are too expensive.
Mainstream credit institutions have never been inter-
ested to support the resource-poor, even though their
loan repayment rates have widely been proven to be
superior to repayment by the better-off. Therefore, since
the 1980s NGOs started to stimulate pump ownership for
small and marginal farmers and the landless. First expe-
riences of Proshika Manobik are documented by Wood et
al (1990). In 1992 20 NGOs and Grameen Bank were found
to have irrigation programmes for the resource-poor.
These agencies monitored 1500 groups, which does not
include the enterprises that functioned already on its
own. Almost 40 per cent of the aggregate number of these
irrigation group members were women (BIDS and WAU,
1992). The six agencies with the most important women’s
programmes were selected for the research.
Below, the main variables influencing women’s partici-
pation in irrigation groups and the impact on their status
will be described first. Then, in the next paragraph major
findings in the 33 female irrigation groups are presented
briefly. DTW development in general and BRAC’s ap-
proach are quite specific and will be elaborated separately
in paragraph five.
Reaching women: NGO approach and
group characteristic
NGO approach and concept of the household
All five NGOs and Grameen Bank start by organising the
resource-poor into groups of varying size, often about
fifteen members. These groups are exclusively male or
female. After some experience with group activities and
after reaching a certain level of group cohesion and
maturity, one of the options offered to such a group is to
purchase and manage an irrigation pump collectively.
This collective pump can be used for irrigating own
household land and/or water sale. In most cases a feasibi-
lity assessment is carried out. Technical, managerial and
social support is given. All NGOs offer this support only
during a certain period and stimulate the enterprise’s
independency as soon as possible.
Some NGOs determine the type of pump beforehand.
RDRS for example only works with small Chinese STWs.
BRAC has developed its irrigation programme exclu-
sively with DTWs. Because of this expensive technology
BRAC has adopted a form of co-management. BRAC’s
male and female members can become shareholders in
the DTW enterprise and thus form a new mixed-sex
group of shareholders. This will be elaborated further in
paragraph five.
The difference in the NGO approach that influences
women’s participation and the impact on their status
most strongly is the differing concept of the household
and way in which intra-household relations are taken into
account. On the one hand there are NGOs with an indivi-
dual approach in which members of one household are
seen as distinctive NGO members. Their own economic
and social empowerment is the NGO’s aim and NGO
resources and training are channelled to these individu-
als. These NGO realise that male resistance might arise
when women’s empowerment is pursued and are, in
principle, ready to support women in such problems.
Proshika Manobik and Proshika Comilla and SNSP have
adopted this approach that can be called the individual
empowerment approach.
The other organisations, RDRS, Grameen Bank and
BRAC focus on the household that is conceived as a unity.
This can be called a household approach. Any household
member is considered to represent the interests of all
other household members. And any household member
who becomes member of an NGO-supported group can
and should act as an intermediary to channel the external
NGO resources to all his or her relatives. Trickle-across of
project’s benefits among household members is assumed
and intra-household hierarchies and negotiations between
household members are not considered to need special
arrangements. The primary aim of Grameen Bank, for
example, is the profitable use of credits by the resource-
poor in order to increase their incomes, whether men’s or
women’s. Gender considerations should not put this
profitability at risk. In the target group criteria of RDRS it
is even forbidden for other family members to become
RDRS member too once one household member has
joined RDRS. In this way RDRS avoids the concentration
of its members in a few households only.
Group strength and main aim
Formally groups should have reached some maturity
before demanding activities such as irrigation are initi-
ated. But in reality there can be a wide variation in the
strength of irrigation groups. Hence, strong and weak
groups can be distinguished in terms of group solidarity,
external linkages, irrigation knowledge and skills, dyna-
mism in leadership, group activity, etc.
Another relevant group characteristic is the main aim of
the irrigation enterprise which can be water sale, both
water sale and irrigating own household land, or, thirdly,
exclusively irrigating own household land. Rice cultiva-
tion in Bangladesh can be classified as a male farming
system in the sense that most land, labour and other
inputs are all controlled by men, who also decide about
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the use of the output (Safiliou, 1988). So water for irrigat-
ing household land fulfils primarily men’s needs. Only in
the rare case of women cultivating their own rice, e.g.
women heads of households, women need irrigation
water themselves. But in most NGO groups these women
are the minority and occupy only a small part of the
command area.
However, water needs evolve continuously as a reac-
tion on new opportunities for productive water use.
Water sale is such an unconventional space open to
women groups.
Findings: women’s participation and
impact on their status
Conditions favouring women’s active participation
and impact on their status
The analysis of the 33 female groups country-wide re-
veals that female groups that succeed best in managing
the irrigation enterprise themselves and for their own
benefit have the following features. The supporting NGO
has adopted an individual approach of women’s
empowerment, and channels its financial, technical and
organisational support directly to the women. The groups
themselves are cohesive and aim primarily water sale
rather than irrigating own household land.
Brac’s DTW programme
Institutional arrangements of the government and BRAC
Strengths and weaknesses of governmental, non-
governmental and market institutions in reaching the
resource-poor, especially women, appear rather sharply
from DTW development in Bangladesh.
Unlike shareholders in the business world BRAC mem-
bers do not have capital readily available to pay a share.
Therefore, BRAC offers five-year loans at the usual inte-
rest rate. Since the period is long total interests rise to 50
per cent of the principal loan amount. This capital loan
and interests have to be repaid in weekly instalments. In
these long term loan arrangements there are no provisi-
ons to stop half-way and to leave the enterprise without
losing all instalments already paid. It is noted that share-
holders sign for this loan but do not get the money in their
hands. Instead, BRAC uses this amount of money to pay
the DTWs from BADC. In reality donors have provided
most of the money for DTWs to BRAC.
For operation during the irrigation season, all sharehol-
ders contribute for operational costs, either by taking a
seasonal operational loan or out of their own pocket.
Then, at the end of the season, the water income is divided
among all shareholders.
During the exploratory phase of the research 19 groups
were visited country-wide, while two mixed-sex BRAC
groups were studied in depth. Both groups have a major-
ity of female members and an elected female manager.
The latter is very exceptional for BRAC’s DTW enter-
prises. Both groups had functioned for five years. The
processes within these two groups show how precisely
the strength of the NGO in organising the resource-poor
and in designing institutional arrangements to bring
water infrastructure within their reach turned against
them. This is valid for women and men shareholders
alike.
Findings: initial enthusiasm
In both groups initial enthusiasm of BRAC members to
become shareholders was great. Only the poorest could
not afford to take any additional loans at all. Many of the
other members who just have some minimal regular
source of income were quite motivated to save money by
investing small amounts in a DTW share: “something for
the future”. The future value of one share was often -but
not always- believed to be fabulous. Investing in an
irrigation enterprise and sharing in water income paid as
crop shares was the more attractive because it is “like
having your own land”.
BRAC’s arrangements fit the needs for investment of
women de facto and de iure heads of household very well.
In most male-headed households in which only women
are BRAC members, women are also quite motivated and
take up the -few- managerial responsibilities. Their hus-
bands or sons contribute financially. In this way women
guarantee that men use their income for paddy. Only in
male-headed households in which men are BRAC mem-
ber themselves too, women BRAC members are at best
nominally involved.
Inappropriate technology
However, this initial enthusiasm if not euphoria disap-
peared very soon when the enterprises appeared to be
unprofitable. The prospects of the feasibility studies made
by BRAC turned out to be far too optimistic. In the best
performing enterprise of the two case-studies, called
enterprise A, there were operational profits, but these
operational benefits were not sufficient to repay the capi-
tal loan within five years. In the other irrigation group, B,
operational costs alone exceeded already the income
from water sale.
In fact, these two enterprises were still among the most
profitable DTWs of BRAC. If all DTWs are ranked from
the highest to the lowest operational profits during the
irrigation seasons of 1991/1992 and 1992/1993, enterpri-
se A and B are among the 13 per cent and 36 per cent best
performing enterprises (BRAC’s 1992 and 1993). Moreo-
ver, capital costs were low because both enterprise A and
B took over existing DTWs and benefitted indirectly from
the higher subsidies under BADC’s earlier rental pro-
grammes. Both initial command areas were about 16 ha,
which is quite normal in Bangladesh nowadays (IIMI,
1995). In enterprise A management is smooth and the
pump functions well technically. Enterprise B has some
problems and these minor problems were already enough
for farmers to start installing their own STWs within the
command area immediately. The command area of this
DTW is only 12 ha now.
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Loan conditions as a trap
As mentioned above, BRAC as loan provider insists on
repayment of the full capital loan and refuses to return
any money already put in to shareholders who want to
withdraw. This definitely increases loan recovery but is
the very mechanism to put the resource-poor sharehol-
ders in an awkward situation when the enterprise is
unprofitable. For them only two options are left: either
drop out by stopping further capital loan repayment and
lose the money put in, or continue to pay the whole capital
loan and try to sell the share. Moreover, the arrangements
put the relatively richer shareholders in a position to take
advantage from the relatively poorer. Basically BRAC’s
institutional arrangements led poor women and men to
compete on a commercial water market without benefit-
ing from the most important feature of this market: an
optimal technology choice. Although these shareholders
cannot be held responsible for the losses in any way, they
risk to bear more losses than any farmer ever had to do
under the governmental arrangements. The strength of
non-governmental agencies, which is their ability to reach
the resource-poor, was used for the wrong purpose.
BRAC’s policy change
The above mentioned policy of BRAC was valid during
the period that the research project was carried out and
when findings were published for the first time. In BRAC’s
later report on the irrigation season 1994-1995 BRAC
concludes, among others, that 76 per cent of its DTW
enterprises bear net losses. Therefore BRAC proposes to
prevent further losses by selling the DTWs. BRAC intends
to “buy back all the shares for these DTWs from the group
members. These shares will be bought at the original
price..” (BRAC, 1995). Although this original price is more
than the commercial market would offer, this arrange-
ment would still imply that BRAC keeps the 50 per cent of
interests on the capital loan that shareholders have paid.
Further, it is not stipulated if and how the partial owner-
ship rights of drop-outs are recognized.
Conclusions
Developments on the technology market and irrigation
water market in Bangladesh during the last thirty years
have brought mainstream irrigation closer to the resource-
poor, including women, than subsidized governmental
institutions had done before. But in order to reach and
organise the resource-poor into groups and provide loans
and other support intervention is still needed. NGOs fill
this gap. Optimal technology choice and a realistic feasi-
bility assessment are crucial and groups should be well-
informed before starting any enterprise. However, risks
of investments in water infrastructure remain substantial
and risk bearing should receive much more attention.
Experiences of existing female irrigation groups coun-
try-wide indicate that resource-poor women only partici-
pate actively in irrigation if the supporting NGO has
articulated women’s own empowerment by irrigation as
an explicit aim and channels its support package directly
to them. Moreover, the women’s group should be strong
and water sale its main aim. But male relatives are still the
ones who take financial responsibilities. In groups in
which irrigating own household land is an important aim,
whether besides water sale or not, irrigation is the affair of
the related men who cultivate these lands. This may be
reinforced by the weakness of the female group and a
supporting NGO that does not pay attention to, or even
stimulates, one household member just channelling NGO
services to other household members. While women’s
economic and non-economic status improves in the first
case, in the latter case women in male-headed households
just sign for the loan. Their own benefits are minimal and
mostly indirect. In both types of enterprises women heads
of households themselves contribute and gain.
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